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Abstract
Interest in unintended discrimination that can result from implicit attitudes and stereotypes (implicit biases) has stimulated many
research investigations. Much of this research has used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure association strengths that
are presumed to underlie implicit biases. It had been more than a decade since the last published treatment of recommended best
practices for research using IAT measures. After an initial draft by the first author, and continuing through three subsequent
drafts, the 22 authors and 14 commenters contributed extensively to refining the selection and description of recommendation-
worthy research practices. Individual judgments of agreement or disagreement were provided by 29 of the 36 authors and
commenters. Of the 21 recommended practices for conducting research with IAT measures presented in this article, all but
two were endorsed by 90% or more of those who felt knowledgeable enough to express agreement or disagreement; only 4% of
the totality of judgments expressed disagreement. For two practices that were retained despite more than two judgments of
disagreement (four for one, five for the other), the bases for those disagreements are described in presenting the recommenda-
tions. The article additionally provides recommendations for how to report procedures of IAT measures in empirical articles.
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Introduction
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) reviewed methods and findings in
an area of research that they identified as implicit social cognition.
Their review focused on research by social and personality
psychologists—and more specifically on research using indirect
measures of attitudes, stereotypes, and self-esteem. Their con-
cluding sentence was: “Perhaps the most significant remaining
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challenge is to adapt these [indirect measurement] methods for
efficient assessment of individual differences in implicit social
cognition.”
Greenwald et al. (1998) addressed that challenge in an ar-
ticle titled “Measuring individual differences in implicit cog-
nition: The Implicit Association Test”. Their article described
three experiments using a method they named Implicit
Association Test (IAT) to measure attitudes (associations of
concepts with valence) indirectly. The subsequent body of
reports of research using the IAT as research procedure now
exceeds 3000 peer-reviewed articles.1
Definition of ‘implicit’
Implicit often appears in psychological publications as an
adjective preceding memory, attitude, stereotype, self-
esteem, identity, or association. These adjective–noun
pairs are often contrasted with pairs in which explicit is
the preceding adjective. The implicit–explicit contrast has
been understood in two ways. Understanding 1 treats
implicit and explicit as properties of psychological
measures, describing measures that assess a construct in-
directly (implici t ly) versus directly (explici t ly).
Understanding 2 treats implicit and explicit as properties
of mental processes or mental representations, which may
be conceived as operating in automatic or unconscious
fashion (implicitly) or in controlled or conscious fashion
(explicitly).
The mental process/representation understanding derives
from memory studies of the 1980s, many of which used indi-
rect measures to reveal operations of memory that occurred
without conscious recollection of the memory-creating events
(cf. Richardson–Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). By the early 1990s,
however, two influential methodological articles (Jacoby,
1991; Reingold & Merikle, 1988) had offered convincing
(and subsequently unrefuted) arguments that it was not justi-
fiable either (a) to treat indirect measures as pure indicators of
unconscious process, or (b) to treat direct measures as pure
indicators of conscious process.
Reviewing the history that preceded their 1995 article that
extended the implicit domain to social cognition, Greenwald
and Banaji (2017, pp. 861–863) similarly concluded that ‘im-
plicit’ and ‘explicit’ are most justifiably used to describe
(respectively) measures that reveal psychological constructs
indirectly and directly rather than as synonyms for ‘uncon-
scious’ vs. ‘conscious’.2 In introducing the Implicit
Association Test, Greenwald et al. (1998) used ‘implicit’ to
describe a property of the method they introduced rather than
of the construct it was measuring. In a later overview of the
research area of implicit social cognition, Fazio and Olson
(2003) even more strongly emphasized indirect measurement
as the distinctive property of implicit measures.
The most forceful argument for Understanding 2 (i.e., men-
tal process or representation interpretations of implicit and
explicit) is that of De Houwer et al. (2009a), who wrote:
“the term implicit can best be understood as being synony-
mous with the term automatic” (p. 350). (Commentary on
their view is available in Gawronski et al., 2009; Nosek &
Greenwald, 2009; and in the reply to those by De Houwer
et al., 2009b.) A virtue of the presently recommended
measurement-based definition (implicit = indirectly mea-
sured) is that researchers can readily agree on distinguishing
between direct and indirect measures, while it appears more
difficult to establish agreement on the extent to which a mea-
sure taps automatic versus controlled mental operations. We
conclude this discussion of controversy about definition with
the (hopefully comforting) observation that this article was
easily written so that the differences among readers’ preferred
understandings of ‘implicit’ should not affect interpretation or
application of the article’s conclusions about recommended
research practices.
Measurement characteristics of IAT measures
References to IAT measures in the remainder of this article
refer to the standard form of the IAT, which has seven sets
(blocks) of trials, each of which presents a stimulus
(exemplar) belonging to one of the IAT’s two target catego-
ries or to one of its two attribute categories. (This standard
procedure is described more fully in Appendix A.) Four of the
seven blocks (ordinally, nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7) present combined
tasks in which exemplars of one pair of categories appear on
all odd-numbered trials, and exemplars of the other pair ap-
pear on all even-numbered trials. This procedure produces an
indirectmeasure (presumably of association strengths), mean-
ing that the subject is given no instruction to report (directly)
on association strengths (or attitudes or stereotypes, etc.). The
subject’s only instructed task is to press a left key or a right
key to classify each exemplar into its proper category. The
same two response keys are used to classify target and attri-
bute concepts, with correct response sides for the two target
categories being switched (from those used initially in Blocks
1 In late June of 2021, the American Psychological Association’s PsycNET
database contained 4459 publications that included “Implicit Association T*”
in at least one of the fields of Title, Abstract, Keywords, or Tests and
Measures. The retrieved items included 3363 peer-reviewed journal articles
and 238 dissertation abstracts. This count does not include numerous publica-
tions in disciplines outside of psychology, including medicine, law, political
science, business, education, and economics.
2 Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined implicit social–cognitive constructs as
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experi-
ence that mediate [response to] social objects” (p. 8). That definition remains
useful, but is silent on the measurement method vs. mental representation/
process distinction that has been focal in subsequent treatments of the defini-
tion of ‘implicit’, such as those of Fazio and Olson (2003) and De Houwer
et al. (2009a, 2009b)
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3 and 4) between right and left for the second combined task
(in Blocks 6 and 7). The implicit measure is determined main-
ly by the latency difference between these two combined
tasks, which provides the numerator of the IAT’s D measure,
for which the now-standard scoring algorithm is described in
Appendix B.
For IAT measures, the psychometric properties of greatest
interest are (a) interpretation of the IAT’s zero point, and (b)
its statistical reliability. Greater detail on these properties than
is presented here can be found in Greenwald et al. (2020).
Interpretation of the IAT’s zero point
The initial publication of the IAT described it as a measure of
“differential association of two target concepts with an attri-
bute” (Greenwald et al., 1998, p. 1464). As described in
Appendix B, the numerator of the IAT measure is computed
as the difference in average response speed between the IAT’s
two combined tasks. Greenwald et al. (1998) interpreted the
zero value of their race attitude IAT measure—obtained when
the race attitude IAT’s two combined tasks were performed at
equal average speed—as indicating absence of preference be-
tween racial Black and racial White (p. 1476). This interpre-
tation is important, because it justifies interpreting values de-
viating from zero in one direction (numerically positive, as
used by most researchers) as indicating automatic preference
for White race, and values deviating from zero in the negative
direction as indicating automatic preference for Black race.3
The absence-of-preference interpretation of an attitude
IAT’s zero point has been debated in several publications
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Blanton et al., 2015; Cvencek
et al., 2020; Greenwald et al., 2006). In their 2015 article,
Blanton et al. offered a regression method to argue that
the absence-of-preference point for race attitude measures
should be properly located at a numeric value of the IAT
score approximately 0.5 SD higher (numerically, more
positive) than the standard scoring algorithm’s zero-point.
That conclusion led to their claim that IAT measures sub-
stantially overestimate (by about 30%) the proportion of
any research sample (or population that the sample repre-
sents) that merits characterization as showing implicit
white racial preference.
A method for validating the absence-of-preference interpre-
tation of the IAT’s zero point is available using balanced iden-
tity theory (BIT; Greenwald et al., 2002). Predictions from
BIT’s balance–congruity principle describe properties of trios
of association-strength measures that should not be empirically
confirmable unless the zero points of all of those association-
strength measures validly indicate absence of difference in
strengths of complementary associations. Data confirming
those BIT predictions, and thereby validating the absence-of-
difference interpretation of the IAT’s zero point, were reported
by Cvencek et al. (2020; see their Fig. 3 and its accompanying
text). Cvencek et al.’s meta-analysis of 36 studies included data
from 9808 IAT respondents and used a variety of trios of IAT
measures. Their most compelling empirical test, derived from
BIT’s balance–congruity principle, was the non-obvious pre-
diction that, in a collection of balanced identity studies using
trios of IAT measures, the linear regression of measures of
correlation between two of the three measures in a balanced
identity study on the means of the study’s third measure (a)
should be positive in slope and (b) should pass through the
origin of the regression’s scatterplot (Greenwald et al., 2002,
pp. 9–10). Themeta-analysis of 36 studies, each with three IAT
measures, permitted constructing a regression scatterplot with
108 (= 36 × 3) data points, each obtained from the correlation of
the mean of an IAT measure with the correlation between two
other IAT measures. The trios of variables in these studies
varied widely in content, allowing a test withmuchmore power
and precision than was available in a previous review (of 18
studies) by Cvencek et al. (2012). The predicted positive re-
gression slope was found very clearly (r = .84). More impor-
tantly for the zero-point test, the intercept of the scatterplot of
this regression passed almost exactly through the scatterplot’s
origin. The intercept, estimated in units of the IAT’s Dmeasure,
was – .005 (95% CI = – 0.048 to 0.038).4
Test–retest reliabilities and internal consistencies of
IAT measures
Greenwald and Lai’s (2020) review of implicit social cog-
nition included an original meta-analysis, from which they
reported that test–retest reliabilities for IAT measures av-
eraged r = .50 (data from 58 studies) and that internal
consistencies of IAT measures averaged α = .80 (data
from 257 studies).
The greater value for internal consistency than for test–
retest reliability indicates the presence of systematic variance
in single IAT observations that is not shared across measure-
ment occasions. More specifically, the aggregate α = .80 in-
dicates that the IAT captures 80% of the systematic (i.e., non-
noise) variance in whatever combination of latent variables
underlies a single-occasion measure. Likewise, interpretation
of aggregate test–retest reliability of .50 is that 50% of the
single-occasion measure’s variance represents a latent
3 The direction of scoring of IAT measures is arbitrary, established by the
researcher’s choice of direction in which the difference between mean laten-
cies in the IAT’s two combined tasks (see Appendix A) is computed (see
Appendix B).
4 The intercept in units of the D measure was not reported by Cvencek et al.
(2020). The figure reported here required a computation that reversed the
direction of the regression reported by Cvencek et al.
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variable that is stable across measurement occasions (with the
other 50% being variable across measurement occasions).5
The moderate reliability of IAT measures is, unfortunately,
often reduced by requirements of non-standard research situ-
ations. When researchers have limited data collection time, as
is often true of Internet data collections, test–retest reliability
may be reduced because of researchers opting to save time by
reducing numbers of IAT trials below the numbers recom-
mended in Appendix A. Examples of such reductions are
Study 4 reported by Lai et al. (2014) and all studies reported
by Lai et al. (2016). Limited attention span of young children
similarly obliges reduced numbers of IAT data collection tri-
als (e.g., Cvencek et al., 2011).
The IAT’s average test–retest reliability of .50 is adequate for
studies that assess correlations of IAT measures with other mea-
sures or for studies that test hypotheses about group differences
or experimental treatment differences in mean IAT scores.
However, test–retest reliability of r= .50 is not adequate to justify
treating a single IAT observation as accurately diagnostic of an
individual’s attitude, stereotype, identity, or self-esteem.
Notwithstanding, one can create an IAT measure that is ade-
quately diagnostic for single persons by repeating IAT measure-
ments,much as is routinely done in research using blood pressure
measures. Blood pressure measures, when used in research on
hypertension, are routinely repeated two, three, or more times on
the same person, within a research session, to provide a measure
that is adequately diagnostic for each research subject (see Smith,
2014; Stergiou et al., 2002). As an example of the prospects for
improving reliability of IAT measures by averaging multiple
observations, data from Lindgren et al. (2018) were used (by
Greenwald et al., 2020) to show that the average of eight IAT
measures obtained from single subjects over a 2-year period had
test–retest reliability of r = .89, a level more than sufficient for an
IAT score to be treated as diagnostic for a single person.
Greenwald and Lai’s (2020) meta-analysis of reliability of
IAT measures found that test–retest reliabilities obtained at the
longest intervals in their data set were similar in magnitude to
those obtained with intervals between 0 and 2 days. Overall,
what is known about test–retest reliability and internal consisten-
cy of IATmeasures agrees with the conclusion fromConnor and
Evers’s (2020) methodological study that IAT measures capture
stable properties of persons, albeit in statistically noisy fashion.
Best Research Practices
Three subsections will describe, first, recommended practices
for selecting categories and exemplar stimuli for IAT
measures; second, recommended practices for administering
IATmeasures; and third, recommended practices for reporting
procedures and results obtained with IAT measures. These
recommended practices developed from a larger set that was
described in a working manuscript that the first author circu-
lated to multiple colleagues in September of 2018. Comments
by these experts led to refinements through three subsequent
manuscript drafts. This article’s Postscript more fully de-
scribes this 7-month refinement process.
The listing of recommended practices does not include two
important practices that are described in this article’s appen-
dixes. Appendix A describes what is widely recognized as the
standard procedure for presenting an IAT measure. Appendix
B describes a scoring procedure for IAT measures that has
been treated as a standard since its publication (Greenwald
et al., 2003). The two appendixes also describe acceptable
variations in these standard procedures.
Best practices for selection of categories and
exemplar stimuli for use in IAT measures
The following recommendations for practices A1–A9 and B1–
B12 (Table 1) have two sources: (a) published experimental
studies of procedural variations and (b) informal knowledge
accumulated in years of research experience by the present set
of authors and others.Most of the experience-based recommen-
dations have been learned from pilot testing of novel IATs (as
recommended in A8, below). For some of the 21 practices, this
article’s description is the only published description. The au-
thors (sometimes not in total unanimity) regard each of the
practices that has not yet been tested experimentally as having
a plausible rationale that supplements the informal evidence of
usefulness obtained in pilot testing. Those interested in varying
from these not-yet-experimentally evaluated procedures are en-
couraged to include them in experimental tests alongside
suspected comparable or superior procedures.
A1. All four categories used in the IAT should be familiar
to subjects
Unfamiliar categories cannot be expected to have associations
measurable using the IAT. Because of expectable slow clas-
sification in responding to exemplars of unfamiliar categories,
those categories will appear to be weakly associated with oth-
er categories. If exemplars for one of two categories in an
attitude IAT are totally unfamiliar, that category will inappro-
priately appear to be negatively evaluated (as was first found
by Brendl et al., 2001). For such categories, an interpretation
in terms of the IAT as a measure of association strengths
involving the unfamiliar categories is not appropriate. To state
this recommendation as simply as possible, the IAT should
not be used to measure associations involving unfamiliar cat-
egories. However, exemplars for a familiar category need not
5 Limited test–retest reliability is typical for latency-difference measures such
as the IAT. Draheim et al. (2019) reviewed the challenges posed by limited
reliability of latency-difference measures that are used in cognitive psycholog-
ical research.
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themselves be highly familiar, so long as they are easily sorted
into their assigned categories (see Recommendation A2). This
was established experimentally in early IAT studies by
Rudman et al. (1999) and by Dasgupta et al. (2000).
The prohibition on totally unfamiliar categories does not
preclude conducting experiments using novel categories for
which both category labels and exemplars are previously un-
familiar (e.g., the Pokemon characters used by Olson & Fazio,
2001, and the fictitious Niffians and Laapians used by
Ranganath & Nosek, 2008). However, studies involving such
unfamiliar categories require preliminary training involving
the novel categories and their exemplars to make them suffi-
ciently familiar to subjects when the IAT is administered.
A2. The primary criterion for selection of exemplar stimuli
for each target and attribute category is that they must be
easy for subjects to sort correctly
Exemplar stimuli that are difficult to categorize will be
responded to slowly in the IAT. As in the case of unfamiliar
categories (see A1), this slowness can inappropriately cause
the category containing those exemplars to appear to be weak-
ly associated with another (target or attribute) category in the
IAT. If exemplars for only one of two target categories in an
attitude IAT are difficult to categorize, that category may in-
appropriately appear to be negatively evaluated. If exemplars
for both target categories are difficult to classify, there may
appear to be no attitude when an attitude might have been
detected with use of easily classified exemplars.
An important contributor to easy classification of exem-
plars is for those exemplars to be representative of their cate-
gories. Several empirical findings have shown that non-
representative exemplars of categories will produce results
different from those obtained with representative exemplars
(e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2006; Govan & Williams, 2004;
Steffens & Plewe, 2001). For example, Govan and Williams
used nettles, skunkweed, and poison ivy as exemplars for the
category flowers, and used butterfly, grasshopper, and firefly
as exemplars for the category insects. Recommendation A8
provides a simple method for selecting exemplar stimuli that
can be easily classified into their respective categories.
Recommendation B6 considers the numbers of exemplars that
should be selected.
A3. Exemplars for any target category should differ
from those for its contrasted target category in just one
primary feature or one set of highly correlated features;
the same should be true for exemplars of the two attribute
categories
When this practice is followed, subjects can have only one
basis for distinguishing exemplars of the two contrasted cate-
gories. Consider some examples of violation of this practice:
Table 1 Recommended practices for selecting categories and exemplar
stimuli, and for administering IAT measures
A. Best Practices for Selection of Categories and Exemplar Stimuli for
Use in IAT measures
A1. All four categories used in the IAT should be familiar to subjects
A2. The primary criterion for selection of exemplar stimuli for each
target and attribute category is that they must be easy for subjects to
sort correctly
A3. Exemplars for any target category should differ from those for its
contrasted target category in just one primary feature or one set of
highly correlated features; the same should be true for exemplars of
the two attribute categories
A4. For IATs designed to measure stereotypes, avoid confounding the
stereotype’s contrasted attributes with valence
A5. Avoid exemplars for one attribute category that are negations of
possible exemplars for the contrasted attribute category
A6. Negations can be satisfactory in category labels
A7. In selecting attribute exemplars, avoid exemplars that have an
idiosyncratic additional basis for association with either of the two
target concepts
A8. Exemplar stimuli for target and attribute categories are best
selected by pilot testing using the category classification tasks
planned for the IAT
A9. When all four concepts in an IAT are expressed as words, font
variations can be used to help subjects distinguish target exemplars
from attribute exemplars
B. Best Practices for IAT Administration Procedures
B1. Counterbalancing the temporal order of the two combined tasks is
generally desirable
B2. Counterbalancing of sides initially assigned to each category is
desirable
B3. Target and attribute category trials are always strictly alternated in
the standard IAT's procedure for combined-task blocks
B4. Intertrial intervals should be brief
B5. Initial practice in classifying the two target concepts (first block)
should precede initial practice in classifying the two attribute
concepts (second block)
B6. It is desirable to use at least 3 exemplars for each category in the
IAT
B7. It is desirable (not essential) for the number of trials in any block to
allow each target exemplar stimulus to be presented the same number
of times within the block, and likewise for the exemplars in each
attribute category
B8. Runs of more than four consecutive same-key-correct trials in
combined-task blocks are undesirable
B9. In correlational studies, statistical power can be increased by using
2 or more administrations of the IAT for each subject
B10. In studies that assess correlations of an IAT measure with other
variables, it is desirable for the subject population to display
substantial variability in the IAT measure
B11. In laboratory research, when IAT-including experiments are
administered by multiple experimenters, treatment conditions should
be distributed equally across experimenters
B12. Desirable procedures for pretest–posttest IAT administrations
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If a (racial) contrast between Asian and African involves only
male exemplars of Asian persons and only female exemplars
of African persons, subjects can use either gender or race as
the basis for distinguishing the two sets of exemplars (see
Mitchell et al., 2003, for studies with such multiple
categorization possibilities). Or, if words for a positive va-
lence attribute are all shown in green font while those for
negative valence are all in red font, subjects are free to sort
based on font color rather than valence. In an attitude IAT
using the race and valence exemplar contrasts just described,
the IAT measure might indicate (depending on subjects’
choice among the available sorting strategies), difference in
valence associations of the race groups, difference in valence
association of the gender groups, or differences in associations
of the font colors with the race or gender groups. Obtaining an
interpretable measure requires selecting exemplars that do not
allow subjects such flexibility in sorting strategy.
When target concepts are represented by face images, this
recommendation obliges consideration of the expressions on
those faces. Having smiling faces for one political candidate
and frowning faces for another in a political attitude IAT is
obviously undesirable. One solution is to have all face images
lack facial expression, although this may be difficult to
achieve when drawing on available collections of face photos.
Equally satisfactory is to use faces with a mixture of smiling
and frowning expressions. Matching the frequencies of ex-
pressions for the two face categories will deny subjects the
opportunity to use facial expression as an alternative guide to
classification.
A4. For IATs designed to measure stereotypes, avoid
confounding the stereotype’s contrasted attributes
with valence
Some published IAT studies have assessed stereotypes using
trait attribute contrasts that confounded the contrasted traits
with valence (examples: strong vs. weak, smart vs. dumb,
sober vs. drunk). Such studies are sometimes intercepted on
the path to publication by reviewers or editors who will note
that the trait contrast was confounded with a valence contrast
and the IAT might therefore have provided an attitude mea-
sure rather than the desired stereotype measure (cf.
Wittenbrink et al., 1997). This confounding would be a devi-
ation from Recommendation A3, by allowing subjects the
option of treating the attribute contrast as one of valence,
effectively converting the intended stereotype measure into
an attitude measure. This problem can often be avoided by
selecting contrasted trait categories that do not differ in va-
lence. Rudman et al. (2001) used two solutions for this prob-
lem in trying to measure a male=strong stereotype. One solu-
tion selected exemplars for strong and weak that were
matched in valence. The other, which was considerably easier
to implement, was to contrast the attribute presumed to be
characteristic of one group (e.g., strength, expected to be more
associated with male) with a similarly valenced characteristic
of the complementary group (e.g., warmth, expected to be
more associated with female). The second strategy simulta-
neously measured two stereotypes (male=strong and
female=warm), which might or might not be desirable, de-
pending on the aims of the research.
The strategy of matching valence for positive and
negative stereotyped attributes is challenging enough so
that it can be informative to illustrate how this is possible,
by describing how it was done by Rudman et al. (2001) in
a study measuring differential association of male vs. fe-
male with strong vs. weak. The challenge is created by the
fact that valence of words meaning strong is substantially
more positive than valence of words meaning weak. In
their Experiment 2 matched valence was achieve by using
a mixture of (a) negative-valence exemplars for both
strong (e.g., fight, fury, violent) and weak (feeble, scraw-
ny, lame), (b) neutral-valence exemplars for both (e.g.,
durable, loud, oak vs. fragile, quiet, feather) and (c)
positive-valence exemplars for both (e.g., bold, mighty,
power vs. delicate, flower, gentle).
A5. Avoid exemplars for one attribute category that are
negations of possible exemplars for the contrasted attribute
category
Negations have the attractive feature of being easy to produce.
However, as demonstrated by Phelan and Rudman (2008); see
also Verschuere & Kleinberg, 2017) negations can cause
difficulty in IATs, likely because of an extra processing
demand of requiring comprehension of the non-negated mean-
ing before apprehending the negated meaning (see Gilbert,
1991, esp. p. 7). For example, processing ‘unhappy’ requires
activating and then negating the meaning of ‘happy’. Some
other examples: trust and distrust, healthy and unhealthy, true
and not true. The negations in these pairs can be avoided by
using instead a synonym (of the negation) that is not in nega-
tion form—e.g.: suspicion in place of distrust, sick in place of
unhealthy, and false in place of not true.
A6. Negations can be satisfactory in category labels
A negation used in a category label must be processed only
once in a block of trials, prior to the start of the block, rather
than at the time of exemplar presentations. Usefulness of ne-
gations in category labels is fortunate because there are cate-
gories for which it is impossible to find a good label other than
in negation form. An example was a study of smoking-related
attitudes by Swanson et al. (2001). The exemplars for the
category smoking were pictures containing cigarettes. The
contrasted category’s exemplars were the same scenes, with
the cigarettes omitted. For this contrasted category, it was not
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possible to find a better label than non-smoking. Many studies
have successfully used Me vs. Not me as category labels in
self–concept or self–esteem IATs, as an alternative to self vs.
other (see Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) . TheMe vs. Not-me
contrast is especially useful when conducting self-related
IATs with young children, for whom the contrast of self vs.
other as category labels may pose a comprehension challenge
(see Cvencek et al., 2011).
A7. In selecting attribute exemplars, avoid exemplars that
have an idiosyncratic additional basis for association
with either of the two target concepts
Some otherwise acceptable attribute exemplars may be
compromised by strong association with one of the target
concepts in the same IAT. Such problems occur infre-
quently and, fortunately, they also tend to be obvious.
One such example is selecting cancer as a negative va-
lence exemplar in an IAT designed to measure attitude
toward smoking—the problem is due to cancer being as-
sociated with the target concept of smoking (and not with
non-smoking) through its association with health rather
than (or in addition to) its valence.
This recommendation was one of two (the other was B1)
for which more than 2 of the 29 persons who evaluated the
recommendation indicated a disagree judgment. (See this ar-
ticle’s Postscript for description of how judgments of agree-
ment and disagreement were obtained.) The four objectors to
A7 offered similar reasoning—that this recommendation
would exclude an attribute exemplar that could be effective
when used in an IATmeasure. A reasoned argument opposing
that objection (given in the next paragraph) was not included
in the draft that the evaluators initially responded to.
Assume that, counter to Recommendation A7, “cancer” is
used as a negative valence exemplar in an attitude IAT con-
trasting target concepts of physical illness vs. mental illness.
In the combined task that assigns the same key to negative
valence and mental illness, cancer’s association with physical
illness will tend to elicit an incorrect response, slowing aver-
age latency. In the other combined task, which assigns the
same key to physical illness and negative valence, cancer’s
association with physical illness will facilitate a correct re-
sponse. The net effect, which is a biasing of the measure
toward greater negativity of physical illness (for all subjects),
can and should be avoided by not using ‘cancer’ as an exem-
plar of negative valence in this IAT.
A8. Exemplar stimuli for target and attribute categories are
best selected by pilot testing using the category classification
tasks planned for the IAT
This recommendation follows on the earlier point (A2)
about ease of classification being a requirement in
selecting category exemplars. Subjects for pilot testing
should come from the intended research subject popula-
tion. The designer of any IAT is often the first pilot sub-
ject, which is entirely satisfactory and appropriate if the
IAT designer is representative of the planned subject pop-
ulation. A judgment as to whether specific exemplars are
easy enough to classify can be based on examination of
data obtained from pilot subjects. The useful data will
come from Blocks 1 and 2 of the standard procedure
(see Appendix A). Pilot subjects should be able to cate-
gorize all stimuli in these two blocks rapidly (average
latency in the range of 600–800 ms for most young adult
subjects) and with low error rates (less than 10%).
Exemplars that just one of a small group of pilot subjects
finds difficult to classify are safely discarded without further
consideration. There is no need for selection criteria such as
word length, word frequency, or meaningfulness, even though
these criteria are appropriate for many other investigations of
categorization. An obvious exception to this just-stated obser-
vation is that word characteristics should not be confounded
with a category contrast, such as by using short words as
exemplars for one category and long words as exemplars for
its contrasted category; this would be a deviation from
Recommendation A3.
A9. When all four concepts in an IAT are expressed as words,
font variations can be used to help subjects distinguish target
exemplars from attribute exemplars
In the very first published IAT (an attitude measure that
contrasted target concepts of flowers versus insects), all four
categories were presented as lowercase words. Some subjects
in that experiment pointed out that they were sometimes un-
certain whether a target concept’s exemplars (e.g., lily or rose)
were to be sorted as flower (target concept) or as pleasant
(attribute concept). Likewise, maggot and roachmight be clas-
sified as insect (target concept) or as unpleasant (attribute
concept). To avoid or reduce this difficulty for subjects, a case
variation was introduced in the second and third experiments
of that first IAT report (Greenwald et al., 1998). Valenced
attribute exemplars were displayed in all lowercase and target
concept exemplars were displayed with initial capital letters.
More substantial font differences between attribute and target
concept exemplars are not problematic. The target–attribute
distinction can be enhanced by simultaneously varying font
color (e.g., green vs. blue), case (upper vs. lower), and type-
face (e.g., Courier vs. Arial) between target and attribute
exemplars.
B. Best practices for IAT administration procedures
Likely because of the IAT’s frequent appearance in empirical
reports, authors have become content with minimally
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reporting details of IAT administration procedures. There is
often not even the citation of a publication in which a reported
IAT’s procedures were previously described in detail.
Consequently, if sub-standard procedures were used, this
may not be detectable in a published report. An opposing
force is that the culture of the field is to share procedures
among researchers, with some likelihood that the most
widely shared procedures are ones developed by re-
searchers who incorporated presently recommended prac-
tices. If the most widely shared procedures incorporate
strong administration procedures, the level of non-
reporting of procedural details may not be a concerning
problem. However, it is a problem that many editors do
not insist on reporting of at least the most important
aspects of procedures. This section on IAT administra-
tion procedures is therefore followed by a section de-
scribing components of procedure that should be most
useful to describe in published reports.
B1. Counterbalancing the temporal order of the two
combined tasks is generally desirable
With two target categories (call them T1 and T2) and two
attribute categories (A1 and A2), the first combined task can
assign the same key to T1 and to either A1 or A2 (and T2 to
the same key as the other attribute category). The earliest IAT
studies observed an order effect such that the association of T1
with A1 (and T2 with A2) was significantly stronger when T1
and A1 were assigned to the same key in the first combined
task rather than when they were assigned to the same key in
the second combined task. To avoid having this effect of
combined-task order on an IAT measure influence observed
means of IAT measures within experimental treatments, it is
desirable to counterbalance, across subjects and within treat-
ment conditions, the order of administration of the two com-
bined tasks.
This recommendation was the second of the two that elic-
ited judgments of disagreement from more than two of the 29
evaluators. The five objectors all assumed that it should be
des i rab le to avoid an (undes i red) ef fec t of the
counterbalancing on correlations of IAT measures with other
variables of interest. More specifically, the objectors’ expec-
tation was that the extraneous variance produced by
counterbalancing would reduce correlations between IAT
measures and other measures of interest.
The goal of maximizing correlations is reasonable, but the
assumption that use of this (or other) counterbalancing will
obscure correlations has two problems. First, researchers can
correct for possible reductions of correlation by using the
counterbalanced variable as a covariate to adjust observed
correlations among other variables. Second, the effect of or-
der of combined tasks is typically small, meaning
(statistically) that its effect on correlations with other variables
is likely to be very small, possibly unnoticeable. 6 The gain
from using the counterbalancing is that sample means will not
be displaced due to the chosen order of combined tasks
influencing the mean IAT value for the entire sample.
B2. Counterbalancing of sides initially assigned to each
category is desirable
There have been no empirically demonstrated effects on IAT
measures of either (a) the attribute category initially assigned
to the left or right key or (b) the side to which each target
concept is initially assigned. Nevertheless, some researchers
suspect that positioning the positive valence category on the
right side may produce a small effect of faster responding than
if negative valence is assigned to the right key.7 This
counterbalancing is relatively easy to achieve and is especially
desirable in studies with large respondent samples, in which
small effects may prove statistically significant. Note that the
basis for counterbalancing here is the general principle that
arbitrary procedural variations are best distributed randomly
across subjects and treatments, which also applies to the order
variation considered in B1. For B1, the known effect of order
on IAT scores definitely strengthens the justification for
counterbalancing, which is why Recommendation B2 is stated
as “desirable” without the added strengthening (“generally
desirable”) used for B1.
B3. Target and attribute category trials are always strictly
alternated in the standard IAT’s procedure for combined-task
blocks
The desirability of the strict alternation procedure was discov-
ered informally (and repeatedly) in variations of IAT proce-
dures tested in 1994–1995 by the authors of the first IAT
publication. The main supporting evidence was that measured
IAT effects consistently had larger effect sizes when this pro-
cedure was used. The authors regarded this strict alternation
procedure as important enough to mention it in five places in
that initial publication (Greenwald et al., 1998). Maximizing
task switches between target concept and attribute concept
classification should have effects of both increasing facilita-
tion of IAT performance in one IAT combined task and
6 Correlations of the order of administering combined tasks with IAT mea-
sures ranged from – .02 to .25 in data reported by Greenwald et al. (2003). For
an observed correlation of r = .40 between the IAT and another variable of
interest, using order of tasks as a covariate and assuming the largest of previ-
ously observed order-effect correlations (.25) would increase that correlation
by only .013, from .400 to .413. (Still, it would be appropriate to conduct this
covariance analysis and report the (slightly) larger correlation as the observed
correlation.)
7 This possible effect depends on an assumption that a right side=positive
cultural association can inflate positivity of a positively valenced concept
when the right key is associated with positive valence in Blocks 2, 3, 4, 6,
and 7 of the standard IAT.
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interfering in the other combined task. Most published reports
of IAT measures presumably use this standard alternation,
although use of this procedure is rarely mentioned in publica-
tions. Occasional reports do mention deviating from the strict
alternation for a specific research purpose (e.g., Mierke &
Klauer, 2003; Rothermund et al., 2009). No published report
has yet indicated that deviation from strict alternation im-
proves either the IAT’s psychometrics or its correlation with
conceptually related measures.
This article’s recommendation is to use the standard alter-
nation between target and attribute discriminations in
combined tasks blocks. Readers may assume, if no mention
is made of this procedure, that researchers used the standard
alternation strategy in combined task trial blocks, but it would
be better to describe that explicitly.
B4. Intertrial intervals should be brief
Greenwald et al. (1998) varied the interval between initiation
of a response on Trial n and presentation of the stimulus for
Trial n+1 among values of 100, 400, and 700 ms. They found
no effect of this variation on magnitude of effects obtained
with IAT measures. After that early finding, researchers have
tended to use quite brief intertrial intervals (250 ms is a com-
monly used value). This conserves time in a procedure that
often has a few hundred trials. (For the standard 190-trial IAT
procedure described in Appendix A, adding 1 second to the
intertrial interval will increase the procedure’s duration by
about 3 min.) A suspected additional virtue of the brief inter-
trial interval—albeit one not studied systematically—is to lim-
it intertrial time that can be used to allow mental rehearsal of
the correct response key assignments. Greater intertrial time
would plausibly reduce difficulty in combined tasks that as-
sign the same key to two non-associated concepts; such op-
portunity to rehearse instructions between trials may permit
faster responding, which might in turn reduce the IAT’s sen-
sitivity to differences in association strengths.
B5. Initial practice in classifying the two target concepts (first
block) should precede initial practice in classifying the two
attribute concepts (second block)
This conclusion was drawn from never-published exploratory
studies conducted prior to the first IAT publication. The ex-
planation: When attribute concept practice comes first, the
attribute initially assigned to the left key can acquire some
association with that key. The ensuing initial practice classifi-
cation of the target categories may then increase the associa-
tion between the target concept practiced on the left key in the
second block and the attribute previously practiced on the left
key. The psychological principle underlying this recommen-
dation ismediated generalization (Cofer & Foley Jr., 1942), a
process by which two categories (e.g., pleasant and insect),
both associated with the same response (e.g., left key), can
thereby become associated with each other. In the recom-
mended procedure, when target concepts are practiced first,
left keymay acquire an association with insect in the first bock.
In the second block, insect may gain some association to
pleasant by mediated generalization (due to their sharing the
left key during the two practice blocks). In the non-
recommended procedure of practicing attribute classification
first, pleasant acquires association with left key in the first
block; then, due to mediated generalization, insect gains some
association with pleasant in the second block. Despite the
conceivable operation of mediated generalization regardless
of order of administering the first two blocks, there is a theo-
retically expected asymmetry of the two orders. In the second
block, the direction of association formation should be from
the category practiced in the second block to the one practiced
on the same key in the first block. The expected stronger effect
of practicing insect in the second block is that it is easier to
form the insect-to-pleasant association than the pleasant-to-
insect association. This asymmetry is explained by Paivio’s
(1969) conceptual peg hypothesis, based on experiments
showing stronger acquisition of associations in noun–
adjective (i.e., target–attribute) direction than in adjective–
noun (i.e., attribute–target) direction.8
B6. It is desirable to use at least three exemplars for each
category in the IAT
In the only experimental study that varied number of exem-
plars for IAT categories, Nosek et al. (2005) found that as few
as two exemplars could be used to represent categories of
pleasant, unpleasant, young, old, male, female, science, and
liberal arts. Use of a single item (the category label) for each
category did not fail totally, but was clearly inferior. These
results should be generalized cautiously because of the limited
number of categories and IAT measures investigated. This
caution is applied here in recommending a minimum of three
items per category. In published studies using the IAT, the
numbers of exemplars per category are mostly in the range
of four to six. Using four or more exemplars should minimize
risk that the category’s effective definition in the IAT may be
distorted by the specific exemplars chosen.
From another perspective, some authors have recommend-
ed using two or more interchangeable sets of exemplars for
categories when it is easy to generate sufficient numbers of
easily classifiable exemplars (as it is for categories such as
positive/negative valence, male/female gender, young/old
age, and black/white race (and many others). Wolsiefer et al.
8 Paivio’s analysis almost certainly also explains why evaluative priming ex-
periments generally use the concept categories (racial groups, ethnic groups,
gender groups) as primes, rather than using the attribute categories as primes
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1986).
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(2017) analyzed the effects of exemplar choice in IAT mea-
surement. They found that variation due to use of different sets
of exemplars was smaller in IAT measures than in other indi-
rect measures of social cognition. In response to a personal
communication inquiring about implications of their findings
for the desirability of using multiple sets of exemplars for IAT
categories, along with multilevel modeling of the variance
contributed by exemplars, Wolsiefer wrote that such use of
exemplar sets and multilevel analysis “doesn’t appreciably
change individual level bias scores . . . . [W]e also examined
whether accounting for stimulus variance in the IAT would
appreciably change the predictive validity of the IAT. We
found no evidence that this was the case.” Even though it is
often a desirable feature of research design, it does not appear
necessary to develop multiple alternative sets of exemplars for
target and attribute concepts in IAT measures. This proves
fortunate because, in many cases, easy-to-classify exemplars
are in short supply.
B7. It is desirable (not essential) for the number of trials in any
block to allow each target exemplar stimulus to be presented
the same number of times within the block, and likewise
for the exemplars in each attribute category
The desirability of this practice is the usual desirability of min-
imizing sources of extraneous variance in data due to differences
in procedures experienced by research subjects. Adoption of this
practice can run into complications in managing equal appear-
ances, due to the numbers of exemplars selected for each target
category and each attribute category. To achieve equal appear-
ances, within each combined-task block, of all attribute-concept
or of all target-concept stimuli, trials in combined-task blocks
must be twice the smallest value that is simultaneously an inte-
ger multiple of the number of unique target exemplars and
unique attribute exemplars. For example, with four exemplars
per target category (total = 8 exemplars) and five exemplars per
attribute category (total = 10 exemplars), the smallest number
that is an integer multiple of both 8 and 10 is 40, requiring a
combined task block to have twice that number, or 80 trials,
which may be an excessive block length for some subject pop-
ulations. An acceptable alternative is to distribute the total of 80
trials across the two blocks of each combined task (an example
is described in Appendix A). When equal numbers are not pos-
sible, it is generally easy to manage stimuli so that no exemplar
of a target category is presented more than once more per block
than any other exemplar of a target category (and similarly for
attribute categories).
B8. Runs of more than four consecutive same-key-correct
trials in combined-task blocks are undesirable
Runs of consecutive trials that require the same (left or right) key
for a correct response allow subjects to increase their
performance speed in the IAT due to a well-known repetition
priming process (e.g., Horner & Henson, 2008) that is unrelated
to strengths of associations between categories that share the
same key. If these runs occur in one combined task and not in
the other, they can inappropriately influence a subject’s IAT
measure. And if they occur more for some subjects than others,
they can similarly add statistical noise to estimates of means or
correlations involving the IAT measure. Lengthy same-key-
correct runs are avoidable in combined tasks by randomizing
trials independently within each consecutive subset of four trials.
Trials 1–4 would then randomly present a stimulus from one
target concept on Trial 1 and from the other target concept on
Trial 3, and a stimulus from one attribute concept on Trial 2 and
the from the other attribute concept on Trial 4; and so on for
Trials 5–8, 9–12, etc., with independent randomization for
even-numbered and odd-numbered trials in each group of four
trials. This strategy limits maximum same-key-correct runs to
four trials. For comparison, randomization within groups of eight
trials will allow occasional same-key-correct runs of eight trials
(which is undesirable).
B9. In correlational studies, statistical power can be increased
by using two (or more) administrations of the IAT for each
subject
This strategy produces an IATmeasure with greater test–retest
reliability than is expected for a single IAT completion. (The
statistical basis for this recommendation was described earlier
in this article’s discussion of test–retest reliability, under the
heading, Measurement Characteristics of IAT Measures.)
Increased test–retest reliability will also reduce unsystematic
variance in estimated sample means, providing both greater
power in tests of experimental treatment effects and increased
magnitude of correlations between IAT measures and
conceptually related variables. An alternative means of
gaining power for both of these purposes is to increase
subject sample sizes. 9
9 A reviewer of the original submission of this article expressed concern about
administering multiple IATs to research subjects, suspecting that subjects with
experience taking IAT measures are likely to try to fake IATs. This seems a
needless concern. There appears to be no reason for concern that subjects more
than very rarely approach a research study with an intent to fake their IAT
responses. Rather, research subjects generally appear to be focused on produc-
ing correct responses in the IAT. Greenwald et al. (2020, pp. 22, 24) reviewed
findings showing that subjects not instructed in how to fake an IAT typically
are unable to deploy an effective faking strategy. In research studies that are
not explicitly studying IAT faking, IATs are generally administered with no
instructions designed to head off faking. Of multiple studies involving subjects
instructed to fake (but without instructions in how to fake effectively) only
Röhner et al. (2011) found statistically significant IAT faking. That finding
was limited to one of the two directions of instructed faking; the authors did
not report a combined statistical test including both directions of instructed
faking.
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B10. In studies that assess correlations of an IAT measure
with other variables, it is desirable for the subject population
to display substantial variability in the IAT measure
This expectation is a statistical consequence of the statis-
tically necessary effect of restriction of range of a variable
on the magnitude of correlations involving that variable
(see, e.g., Cohen et al., 2003, p. 57). As example, if one
assesses a correlation between gender identity (which
varies widely between male and female) and gender atti-
tude (which is correlated with gender identity), one ob-
serves a stronger correlation when the sample includes
both male and female subjects than when the sample is
either exclusively male or exclusively female. Similarly, a
race attitude IAT (means of which vary substantially be-
tween African Americans and European Americans) will
be more strongly correlated with a parallel self-report
measure and with other theoretically connected measures
when the research sample includes both racial groups than
when the sample is limited to one of those two groups.
This increased sensitivity to correlations is a justification
for not subdividing a sample into demographically homo-
geneous groups when one or more variables being corre-
lated differ non-trivially between the demographic groups
that would thereby be analyzed separately.
B11. In laboratory research, when IAT-including experiments
are administered by multiple experimenters, treatment
conditions should be distributed equally
across experimenters
This generally advisable research practice is recommended
here because of its known importance in research using IAT
measures. The effect of experimenter race on subject perfor-
mance on race attitude IAT measures was first demonstrated
by Lowery et al. (2001). Effects of other experimenter char-
acteristics have not been established so clearly as for race of
experimenter in the race attitude IAT, but are easily
conceivable.
B12. Desirable procedures for pretest–posttest IAT
administrations
The first IAT ever completed by a subject is known, on
average, to show a more polarized result (i.e., greater dis-
tance from zero) than will a second or subsequent IAT
completion (first reported by Greenwald, Nosek, &
Banaji, 2003; see also Lai et al., 2016). This not-yet-
fully-understood effect may be due to the first administra-
tion having slower responding on combined tasks than do
subsequent administrations, if this slowing occurs more
on the combined task that is more difficult for the subject.
There are two ways to deal with the resulting expectation
of a spurious change between the first and second IAT in
a pre-post design: (1) Use a no-treatment control group
that also receives both pretest and posttest (used first with
IAT measures by Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001), or (2)
give all subjects pre-experimental IAT completion expe-
rience, which need not use the same IAT intended for the
pretest–posttest design. Without one of these approaches,
there is a risk of mistakenly interpreting an observed at-
tenuation of IAT on a posttest as a treatment-caused re-
duction of the IAT.
C. Recommended practices for reporting IAT
procedures and results
It is often desirable to use IATs with procedures borrowed
from a previous study that assessed the same or very similar
constructs (i.e., attitudes, stereotypes, identities, or self-es-
teem). When portions of procedures in a new report are iden-
tical to ones reported in an accessible previous publication, it
should suffice to cite the prior publication, giving the page
number(s) on which those identically used procedures were
described.
C1. Procedures that should be described in all empirical
publications of original IAT results
Logistics and apparatus Describe how subjects were re-
cruited including any selection criteria or recruiting aids
that were used. Report how many subjects began partici-
pation and causes of unavailability of data from those
who began the procedure, including criteria for excluding
partial or all data from participants who began the proce-
dure. If conducted in a laboratory, the report should state
laboratory location and physical properties, including na-
ture of separation of multiple participants from one anoth-
er; also computer type, operating system, monitor size,
viewing distance, and laboratory software used to present
IAT procedures and record data. If presented via Internet
or otherwise remotely, describe software used for presen-
tation and software or hardware required on the user’s
side; also state whether procedures were presented full
screen or otherwise.
Stimuli Report all category labels and all exemplar stimuli
(verbatim) for each category. If exemplars are words in a
language other than English, many readers will appreciate
having English translations (e.g., in parentheses). Report font
name, size, and capitalization used for all categories with ex-
emplars presented as words, and on-screen dimensions for
pictures or graphics used for exemplars presented other than
as words.
Behav Res
Trial presentation procedures Give the numbers of trial
blocks, the number of trials in each block, and indicate the
categories assigned to left and right keys for each block. Either
state that trials in combined-task blocks were strictly alternat-
ed be tween target and at t r ibute ca tegor ies (see
Recommendation B3) or, if that was not done, describe the
procedure for sequencing exemplars of the four categories.
State whether procedures restricted runs of number of same-
key-response trials in combined-task blocks (see
Recommendation B8). Describe the intertrial interval within
blocks of trials (i.e., the interval between initiating a key press
and appearance of the next trial’s stimulus) and length of
pauses between blocks of trials (or that pauses were ad lib, if
they were under subjects’ control). Report (preferably verba-
tim) instructions provided to subjects about speed or accuracy
of responding. Describe how erroneous responses were treat-
ed by the software and instructions (if any) given to subjects
for what they should do on receiving error feedback. Describe
counterbalancing (if any) for left or right side of correct re-
sponses for categories in Blocks 1 and 2 and the order of
encountering combined-task blocks.
C2. Computation of IAT scores
The most widely used procedure for scoring IAT mea-
sures is the D score that was introduced by Greenwald
et al. (2003; also described fully in this article’s
Appendix B). The D algorithm affords a few scoring
options for treatment of trials on which errors occurred;
the error treatment method that was used should be
reported. Although the D algorithm is resistant to dis-
turbance by extreme scores, it does oblige exclusion of
trials with latencies greater than 10 s and exclusion of
entire data from subjects for whom more than 10% of
trials have latencies faster than 300 ms. Subjects with
this high a proportion of very fast responses are invari-
ably ones who are trying to complete the procedure
with maximum speed, pressing keys as rapidly as they
can without concern for accuracy, and generally having
error rates approximating 50%. Perhaps surprisingly, it
is neither necessary nor desirable to drop subjects with
relatively high error rates (even approaching 40%), so
long as they are taking the procedure seriously and are
trying to produce correct responses. The D algorithm
does not truncate latency distributions to eliminate oc-
casional very fast or very slow (short of 10 s) trials. If
the scoring procedure in a report is deliberately varied
from Appendix B’s recommendations, the variations and
the justification for using them should be reported, to
avoid readers’ concern about questionable research
practices.
C3. Reporting of internal consistency of the IAT measure
Statistical measures of internal consistency estimate the
degree to which multiple items in a self-report measure
(such as a scholastic aptitude test or a self-esteem inven-
tory) agree in what they are measuring. For an IAT mea-
sure, “items” are subsets of trials that suffice to compute
an IAT measure. An IAT measure can be computed (very
minimally) as a difference between latencies on two trials,
one from each of the two combined tasks. If there are 60
trials in each combined task (as in the standard procedure
described in Appendix A) it is possible to compute 60
IAT part-scores, which can be used for an internal con-
sistency computation.
The extreme approach of computing two-trial IAT sub-
measures is almost never used for internal consistency com-
putations. Five more commonly used approaches are briefly
described here, in order of increasing expected precision: (1)
The computationally simplest approach is to correlate an IAT
score computed with data from Blocks 3 and 6 of the standard
procedure (see Appendix A) with a second score computed
similarly from Blocks 4 and 7. This is convenient because
these two-part scores are obtained in computing the standard
IAT scoring algorithm’s D measure (see Appendix B). (2)
One part-measure can be computed from all odd-numbered
trials in the IAT’s combined-task blocks, and the other from
all even-numbered trials. This may seem problematic because
the IAT’s strict alternation of target and attribute exemplars
(see Recommendation B3) results in one of these part mea-
sures using data exclusively from target category trials, and
the other exclusively from attribute category trials. (3) A ran-
dom selection of half of the trials from each combined task can
be used as one part, with the remaining trials being the second
part. (4) More cumbersome to compute, but also the method
most likely to make the two parts as comparable as possible, is
to sort all trials for each combined task into the four distinct
categories of stimuli (i.e., those for the two target categories
and the two attribute categories), then take either a random
half from each of the four categories as one part with the
remaining trials as the other part, or (5) compute one part by
dividing each of the four categories within each combined task
in half by a method that will assure that neither of the two
halves over-represents trials occurring either early or late in
the procedure. Although the last of these five procedures is
expected to provide the greatest precision, all of the last three
are quite satisfactory.
C4. Reporting of test–retest reliability of IAT measures
Test–retest reliability of IAT measures is computed as the
correlation between two repetitions of the IAT measure ob-
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tained from the same sample of subjects. Because research
studies rarely repeat the same IAT measure, test–retest reli-
ability is very infrequently reported. Searching rigorously for
reports of test–retest reliability of IAT measures, Greenwald
and Lai (2000) found only 58 reports of test–retest reliability
correlations. Perhaps this article’s Recommendation B9 will
lead to more studies obtaining repeated IAT measures from
the same subjects.
Opportunities for improvement on current
best practices
Since 1998, multiple attempts have been made to produce
new latency-based indirect measures of the constructs
assessed by IAT measures. Table 1 in Greenwald and
Lai (2020) summarizes six such alternative methods.
Additionally, there have been multiple proposals for alter-
native approaches to scoring the data produced by IAT
measures (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2007)
or by variants of IAT measures (e.g., Meissner &
Rothermund, 2013). Although none of these alternatives
is yet established as an improvement over the standard
form of the IAT (see Appendix A) or the currently stan-
dard scoring algorithm (see Appendix B), there is no rea-
son to conclude that continued or further efforts to im-
prove IAT procedures and scoring methods will be futile.
The following paragraphs describe three goals for poten-
tial improvement.
Improving the statistical reliability of IAT measures
Increased test–retest reliability of IAT measures can ben-
efit statistical power of all research designs (correlational
or experimental) that use IAT measures. It can also enable
(or at least advance) the possibility that IAT measures can
become precise enough to accurately describe individual
respondents’ levels of implicit bias. A method of improv-
ing test–retest reliability of any measure is to administer it
to the same person multiple times, then average the two or
more observed scores. As described earlier in this article,
that strategy has been used very successfully with blood
pressure measures in hypertension research. A necessary
cost of the measure-repetition strategy is the time it adds
to data collection. Because minimizing time is especially
a priority in Internet-conducted research that can allow
large samples, the measure-repetition strategy is more fea-
sible for laboratory-administered studies than for Internet-
administered studies. A more ambitious strategy for im-
proving reliability is to find ways to reduce the statistical
noise inherent in multi-trial reaction time measures. A
successful noise-reduction strategy might well benefit
from findings obtained with latency measures in areas of
research other than social cognition. Because the problem
of inherent noisiness of latency measures has been known
for well over a half-century, the current lack of available
solutions indicates how challenging this goal is.
Extending the IAT to measure strengths of
associations involving subcategories
“Subcategory” here refers to a concept defined by the
intersection of two categories. Some such intersections
that have already attracted interest are those of race with
age (for example, Asian child as distinct from Asian
adult) or race with gender (such as Black female as dis-
tinct from Black male or White female). Associations with
such intersectional categories are conceivably either (a)
the logical union of attributes associated with the two
intersecting categories—i.e., the sum of attributes associ-
ated with the two categories, or (b) the logical intersection
of attributes of the two categories—i.e., only those attri-
butes that are associated with both categories. More inter-
esting than both of those possibilities, but also more chal-
lenging, is that the intersection may be a qualitatively
distinct category with its own associated attributes.
At present, no method exists for using an IAT to assess
associations for an intersection of two demographic cate-
gories that may be different from associations with the
categories individually. What might intuitively appear
the obvious way to compare different intersections of
two demographic categories in an IAT is to select, as
exemplars for each intersection, persons who embody that
intersection. For example, an IAT contrasting the intersec-
tion, Black female, with the intersection, Black male,
might illustrate each with images—one set of images of
Black women and one set of Black men. Pilot testing
experience has revealed that subjects respond to such an
IAT as if the images possessed only the attribute that
distinguishes the two sets of images—in this case, only
gender. Specifically, in an IAT with attribute categories of
career vs. family, if the two target concepts are Black
female and Black male, the IAT is expected to produce
the same finding as an IAT involving all racially White or
all racially Asian person images. The suspected reason for
this (not yet strongly tested in experimental research) is
that producing correct responses requires attending only
to the attribute (gender, in these cases) that distinguishes
the two sets of images. It is apparent that some other
approach is needed if an IAT procedure is to be success-
fully adapted to assessing associations with category
intersections.
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Extending the IAT to measure strengths of
associations involving propositions
Several researchers have sought to construct IATs that could
measure associations of agreement or disagreement with prop-
ositional meanings. One approach to this task was developed
by Sartori et al. (2008), measuring association of truth or fal-
sity with autobiographical events. In this task, categories of
true and false were represented by exemplars in the form of
brief sentences that could easily be classified as factually true
or false. Others have subsequently similarly used propositions
as exemplars for non-propositional categories (e.g., De
Houwer et al., 2015; Lu, 2016). This appears to be a success-
ful strategy, although it is not yet apparent how broadly it can
be applied.
An alternate use of propositions in IAT measures is for
the propositions to be category labels for the IAT, rather
than category exemplars. One successful use of proposi-
tions as category labels for an IAT is the personalized IAT
(Olson & Fazio, 2004) in which the propositional labels I
like and I don’t like were used in place of the (non-
propositional) pleasant and unpleasant attribute labels of
most other IAT attitude measures. A second use of prop-
ositions as category labels is in the wanting IATs devel-
oped by Koranyi et al. (2017) and by Tibboel et al.
(2017). In these, category labels represent a goal-
directed motivational state, using propositional category
labels of I want and I do not want. Koranyi et al.’s pro-
cedure also required making subjects thirsty (by eating at
least 8 salty crackers in two minutes) prior to completing
the IAT.
Not yet attempted in propositional category labels are
propositions with any complexity of syntactic structure or
propositions with verbs other than ones expressing liking
or wanting. An example of a conceivable IAT with greater
complexity and other verbs in propositions is one in
which the contrasted target concepts are legalize abortion
and outlaw abortion. A challenge that has no obvious
solution (for this hypothetical example) is to create exem-
plars that subjects can easily classify as representing these
two contrasted propositions. Although recommended best
practice B6 advises using at least three exemplars for an
IAT category, it is conceivable that, with propositional
target concepts, using the proposition itself as the sole
exemplar might suffice. That may succeed if the
contrasted propositions are only two words in length,
but consider a more complex contrasted pair of proposi-
tions: European countries should pay a larger fraction of
their GDPs than the U.S. to cover NATO costs and U.S.
and Europe should pay the same fraction of their GDPs
to cover NATO costs. Instructions might be used to allow
abbreviating these as NATO costs: EU more than US and
NATO costs: EU same as US. Either these or the pair
involving abortion could be used in IATs to assess
strength of association of these policies with contrasted
political ideologies, political parties, or political candi-
dates. Such research remains to be done.
POSTSCRIPT: 29-person jury evaluates this
article’s recommended practices
Writing of this article started in early 2018, a few months
before the 20th anniversary of the IAT’s first publication.
That seemed a good time to review what had been confidently
learned from empirical research using the IAT as research
method, as well as to consider the history of theoretical and
methodological controversies concerning the IAT, and also to
summarize current wisdom on best practices for conducting
research using IAT measures. Overviews of accumulating
knowledge and discussions of interpretive controversies had
been treated in several handbook chapters and journal review
articles during the last decade (see the overview of those
reviews by Greenwald & Lai, 2020). However, best practices
for research using IAT measures had not received any pub-
lished treatment since two book chapters published in 2007
(Lane et al., 2007; Nosek et al., 2007). The first author’s initial
attempt at a new summary of best research practices produced
Draft 1 of a manuscript titled “The Implicit Association Test at
Age 20: What is known and what is not known about implicit
bias” (“Age20” hereafter).
Draft 1 of Age20 was circulated to 73 researchers and
scholars whowere (a) authors of empirical or theoretical articles
concerning the IAT or (b) among the 32 participants at a
September 2017 National Science Foundation “Implicit Bias
Conference” or (c) among the 26 presenters at an upcoming
November 2018 Ghent University conference titled
“Improving the Utility of Indirect Measures”. These three over-
lapping lists included researchers with widely ranging views on
understanding of the IAT as a psychological measure. The mes-
sage to each of these 73 described the manuscript’s purpose as
“to describe a consensus on what is currently known about the
IAT”, adding: “The attached draft includes [the first author’s]
views on what is known—hardly a consensus—[and seeks]
opinions and suggestions to convert this version into one with
reasonable claim to reporting a consensus.”
Within a month after Draft 1’s circulation, 25 of the
invitees had responded. Sixteen of them provided exten-
sive comments, each prompting follow-up exchanges of
email that provided the bases for multiple revisions. In
November 2018, the Ghent University conference provid-
ed opportunity not only for discussions of issues raised by
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several of the attendees in response to Draft 1, but also
allowed discovery of additional well-qualified researchers
among the conference’s non-presenting attendees. In late
November of 2018, Draft 2 was circulated to the original
73 plus 14 more. Four of the new recipients sent substan-
tial comments on Draft 2, as did several of the previous
commenters, leading to further revisions.
Although the responses to Drafts 1 and 2 prompted useful
revisions, they did not allow assessment of consensus for the
various research practice recommendations. To overcome that
limitation, a spreadsheet that could assess consensus was pre-
pared. The spreadsheet gave each recipient the role of a juror
who was asked to judge agree, disagree, or uncertain for each
conclusion statement. The instruction on the spreadsheet con-
cluded, “Please be reluctant to use the uncertain response when
you are aware of a balance of evidence favoring agree or dis-
agree. Feel free to add a comment in the NOTES column if it
might be useful, but treat this as optional.” Draft 3, accompa-
nied by the spreadsheet, was circulated in late December, 2018
to all those who had received Draft 2. Twenty-five spreadsheets
were returned. All of Draft 3’s conclusions received majority
agreements on the spreadsheet, but therewere neverthelessmul-
tiple judgments of disagreement with individual recommenda-
tions, mostly accompanied by explanations of the bases for
disagreement. Further follow-up correspondence made clear
that common ground would not be found for a few of the
conclusions, warranting one further draft.
Draft 4 was circulated in March, 2019 to the 35 commenters
who had provided comments (most more than once) on the three
previous drafts. Draft 4 was accompanied by a revised spread-
sheet, which stated the recommended practices very similarly to
their appearance in this article.10 Two of Draft 1’s eleven recom-
mendations for selection of categories and selection of exemplar
stimuli were dropped because of insufficient consensus. For four
of the 12 recommendations for administering IAT measures,
Draft 4 included revised content that addressed concerns that
various commenters had expressed in response to earlier drafts.
Circulation of Draft 4 was accompanied by messages to each of
the 35 commenters, including (as appropriate) description of how
Draft 4 had been revised in response to their latest comments,
and also requesting their use of an accompanying repeat copy of
the revised spreadsheet to revise any judgments that warranted
change in consideration of Draft 4’s revisions that had attempted
to accommodate the final wave of comments. For the ten who
had not previously provided spreadsheets, there was a reminder
that a completed spreadsheet would still be very welcome. In
response to that invitation, four new spreadsheets were received,
in addition to five from previous providers of spreadsheets that
contained one or more revised judgments.
The just-reviewed process of preparing Age20 yielded 29
spreadsheets from authors and commenters, each providing
evaluations of agree, disagree, or uncertain for each of
Table 1’s recommendations.11 The original 73 invitees could
be classified into (a) persons who were known, on the basis of
their past publications, to be favorable to the IAT as a research
procedure (N = 25 [34%]), (b) persons known to be critics of
the IAT in one respect or another (N = 18 [25%]), (c) persons
ambivalent regarding the IAT, meaning that their publications
used IAT measures but sometimes reached IAT-critical con-
clusions (N = 10 [14%]), and (d) persons who were knowl-
edgeable about the IAT but who had done neither supporting
nor critical research (N = 20 [27%]). For the final 29 who
became the 29 judges, the corresponding numbers in those
four categories were (a) 19, (b) 3, (c) 5, and (d) 2.
Considering that the IAT-favorable invitees had the greatest
research experience using IAT measures, it is not surprising
that about 2/3 of the 29 (compared to only about 1/3 of the full
set of invitees) were in that category.
For the final judgments of this article’s recommended re-
search practices, 3.9% of all judgments were in the “disagree”
category and 9.4% were “uncertain”. The remainder (86.7%)
were judgments of “agree”. Understandably, most of the “un-
certain” judgments were for recommendations that had been
based only on researchers’ pilot testing experience. Only two
best practice recommendations received more than 2 “dis-
agree” judgments from the 29 judges. These were A7, which
was the recommendation to avoid attribute exemplars that had
some extraneous basis for association with one of the two
target concepts, and B1, the recommendation to routinely
counterbalance order of combined tasks. The bases for these
“disagree” judgments are described in this article’s sections
that present these recommendations.
For B2–B12, there were more than two judgments of uncer-
tainty for six of the recommended best practices. Greatest un-
certainty (N = 9) was expressed for Recommendation B5, that
initial practice in classifying the two target concepts should
precede initial practice in classifying the two attribute concepts.
Next most uncertainty (N = 7) was for Recommendation B3, to
strictly alternate target and attribute trials in combined tasks.
The uncertainty in these two cases and the lesser uncertainty
for a few other recommendations are understandable given that
the primary basis for each of these recommendations was un-
published pilot testing experience of previous researchers rather
than controlled experiments. For all of B2–B12, the judgments
10 A few had subsequent rewordings that did not alter their meaning, including
B10, which was changed from a recommendation of what not to do to a
recommendation of what to do.
11 The 29 judges sometimes left blank responses, which were treated as equiv-
alent to a judgment of “uncertain”.
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of more than 90% of those who expressed either agreement or
disagreement were judgments of agreement. Even though fur-
ther research to evaluate some of these recommendations is
clearly desirable, the high levels of expressed agreement justi-
fied regarding these as recommended practices until further
empirical evidence indicates otherwise.
Appendix A
“Standard” (seven-block) IAT procedure
As most frequently used in research, an IAT consists of seven
sets (blocks) of trials in which stimuli from four categories are
classified. Any IAT is completely specified by the labels to be
used for the four categories and the stimulus items (exemplars)
used to represent each of the four categories. The subject’s
task in each of the seven blocks is to provide correct classifi-
cations of stimulus items by pressing an assigned left- or right-
positioned key on a computer keyboard—for example “E”
and “I” (alternately, “D” and “K”) on a QWERTY
keyboard—into their categories. Most often, two of the cate-
gories are identified as target categories. The first reported
IAT (Experiment 1 in Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998) used flower and insect as the labels for its two target
categories. The other two categories are typically identified as
attribute categories. In the flower–insect attitude IAT the at-
tribute categories were pleasant and unpleasant (valence).
The standard order of seven blocks (typical trial numbers
[totaling 190] in parentheses), is
1. Classify the items for the two target categories (20)
2. Classify the items for the two attribute categories (20)
3. Classify items for all four categories, one attribute and one
target category assigned to each of the two keys, using the
assignment of categories to left and right keys as in
Blocks 1 and 2 (20).
4. Same as Block 3 (40).12
5. Classify the two target categories, reversing the key as-
signments of Block 1 and havingmore trials than in Block
1 (30).
6. Classify items for all four categories, using the reversed
key assignments of the target categories as in Block 5 (20).
7. Same as Block 6 (40).
The number of trials for reversed two-category practice in
Block 5 can affect the magnitude of effect on the IAT of the
order in which the two combined tasks are encountered. After
several years of experience, an increase from 20 to 30 trials in
Block 5 was adopted as a procedure that often keeps the effect
of order of combined tasks to a minimum.
For the four combined-task blocks (3, 4, 6, and 7), which
present exemplar items from all four categories, there is a
strict alternation between presenting an item from one of the
two target categories on odd-numbered trials and an item from
one of the two attribute categories on even-numbered trials
(see B3). Determination of which target category is assigned
a left (vs. right) key response in Block 1 and how attribute
categories are assigned to keys in Block 2 are typically
counterbalanced across subjects. There are typically between
four and six items in each of the four categories. The number
of trials in a block is often adjusted to allow each of the stimuli
to appear equally often. With the same number of exemplars
(n) for each of the four categories, this can be done in the two-
category blocks (1, 2, and 5) by having trial counts that are
integer multiples of 2n, and in the combined-task blocks (3, 4,
6, and 7) trial counts being an integer multiple of 4n. With five
items per category, the numbers might be as shown in the
seven-block listing above. With four items per category, the
numbers of trials in the seven blocks might by 16, 16, 32, 48,
24, 32, 48. For six items per category, these numbers might be
12, 12, 24, 48, 24, 24, 48.
As stated in Recommendations B6 and B7, however, ex-
actly equating numbers of presentations for target or attribute
exemplars should be subordinated to other considerations in
determining the trial count for each block. As one example,
the numbers for four items per category might be set at 16, 16,
24, 40, 24, 24, 40. The number of appearances of each item in
combined tasks can then be equated because the sum of trials
in each combined-task’s pair of blocks is an integer multiple
of 4n—e.g., for Blocks 3 and 4 the sum is 24+40 = 64 (= 4 ×
4n). Other numbers of items per category, especially with
different numbers of exemplars in attribute and target catego-
ries, might require inappropriately large numbers of trials to
maintain equal appearances of each exemplar for target and/or
attribute categories. The strict equality need not be treated as
essential.
A procedure that records latency to occurrence of the cor-
rect response is typically used, with the IAT program record-
ing occurrence of error responses but not registering the trial’s
latency as completed until the correct response occurs. The
value of this built-in-error-penalty method was shown by
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). For laboratory soft-
ware that does not permit waiting for occurrence of the correct
response on each trial, a scoring method with latency penalties
in the form of milliseconds added to error trials is described in
Appendix B.
12 The smaller numbers of trials in Block 3 than in Block 4 (and similarly
fewer in Block 6 than in Block 7) is the result of historical accident. In the
earliest IAT studies using the seven-block procedure, Blocks 3 and 6 were
treated as practice of the two combined tasks, with the following longer blocks
(4 and 7) treated as data-collection trials. When the IAT scoring algorithm
(Greenwald et al., 2003) was being developed, largely by exploratory analyses
of many alternative possibilities, it was discovered that treating Blocks 3 and 6
as data collection trials produced a measure with properties superior to one
computed just from Blocks 4 and 7 (as in the earliest IAT studies). (See p. 202
of Greenwald et al., 2003.)
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Appendix B
SD1 ¼ SQRT NA1−1ð Þ*SDA1 2þ NB1−1ð Þ*SDB1 2ð Þ þ NA1þ NB1ð Þ* MnA1−MnB1ð Þ 2ð Þ=4ð Þð Þ= NA1þ NB1−1ð Þð Þ
SD2 ¼ SQRT

NA2−1ð Þ*SDA2 2þ NB2−1ð Þ*SDB2 2
 
þ NA2þ NB2ð Þ* MnA2−MnB2ð Þ 2ð Þ=4
 
= NA2þ NB2−1ð Þ
 
In the above two lines, ‘N’, ‘Mn’, and ‘SD’ indicate num-
bers of trials, means, and standard deviations for the block
indicated by the following two characters (A1, B1, A2, or
B2); the caret (^) precedes an exponent.
Table 2 of Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji (2003) suggested
two options for the error penalty computation. One of these
(D3) used twice the block’s SD (i.e., twice SDA1, SDA2,
SDB1, or SDB2, depending on the block in which the error
occurred). The other option (D4) used a constant of 600 ms for
all blocks. Greenwald et al. also noted the option of deleting
responses faster than 400 ms, a procedure that typically affects
the resulting measure very little.
Algorithms for the IAT’s D measure
Step
Built-in error penalty procedure (preferred)
Each trial’s latency is recorded to occurrence
of the trial’s correct response; trials on which
errors preceded the correct responses are included
Computed error penalty
For IAT procedures that end a trial on the first keypress,
recording the latency of that keypress and code the response
as correct or error
1 Designate combined tasks as A (for which faster performance will produce a
positive score) and B (for which faster performance will produce a
negative score). With counterbalancing, half of subjects will encounter A
in Blocks 3 & 4, half in Blocks 6 & 7
Same
2 Discard all trials in Blocks 1, 2, and 5 Same
3 Identify blocks for combined task A as A1 and A2; those for combined task
B as B1 and B2. If task A is Blocks 3 & 4, Block 3 is A1, Block 4 is A2
Same
4 Eliminate from remaining data (Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7) only trials with
latencies > 10,000 ms
Same
5 Eliminate all subjects for whom more than 10% of remaining trials have
latencies faster than 300 ms
Same
6 Compute latency means (MnA1, MnA2, MnB1, MnB2) and SDs (SDA1,
SDA2, SDB1, SDB2) for each of the four blocks for all remaining trials
Compute latency means for correct responses in each
of the four blocks (separately) for remaining trials; also,
replace each error response with a score computed as themean of
correct responses in the same block as the error, plus a penalty
(see the note below this table)
7 Compute two mean latency differences: B1–A1 = (MnB1 – MnA1) and
B2–A2 = (MnB2 – MnA2)
Compute the two mean latency differences from all trials, including
the error trials that were replaced
in Step 6 using error penalties
8 Compute an inclusive (not pooled) SD1 using all latencies in Blocks A1 &
B1; another (SD2) using all latencies for A2 & B2 (SD2). These can be
computed from means and SDs from Step 6 as shown in the lines below
this table
Compute the two inclusive SDs using all trials
(using the error trials with their replaced latencies)
9 Compute (B1–A1) / SD1; and (B2–A2) / SD2 Same
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